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IN DEFENSE OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS:
THE DOMINATION OF TITLE VII BY THE
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
CHUCK HENSON†
INTRODUCTION
It has been said that within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Congress gave the moral principle of “equality” a
foundation in national law.1 Taken as a statement of Title VII’s
purpose, such purpose anchors the persistent belief that
Congress intended Title VII as a radical and permanent
departure from the past. De jure and de facto discrimination and
the rule of employment-at-will represent the past. Title VII

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

551

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 82 Side A

†
Interim Vice Chancellor, Division of Inclusion, Diversity and Equity,
University of Missouri School of Law; Trial Practice Professor of Law, University of
Missouri School of Law; Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution,
University of Missouri School of Law; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center,
1990; B.A., Yale University, 1987. The author would like to give a special thank you
to Professor William R. Corbett for his thoughtful commentary and whose article,
The “Fall” of Summers, The Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the Escalating Subordination
of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: Lessons from
McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996), helped inspire this Article.
Additionally, the author gives many thanks for the encouragement, guidance, and
editorial advice of Dean Rafael Gely, Professor Miriam Cherry, Professor David
Mitchell, Dean Rigel Oliveri, and Professor Joshua D. Hawley; thanks for the
research assistance of Scott Smithson and Chris Lesinski; and thanks to the John
W. Cowden Faculty Research Fellowship and the W. Dudley McCarter Faculty
Research Fellowship for supporting this endeavor. Finally, the author thanks Renee
Elaine Henson for her constant support and Paris Olivia Henson for giving him a
reason to continue to confront the monsters hiding under the bed.
1
Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin Is Now
Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 940 (1994) (“Title VII molded the basic
moral principle of equal treatment into a national policy to eliminate employment
discrimination.”); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV.
203, 210 (1993) (“In passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Congress stressed that
equal employment opportunity is a basic right in this country. The legislature noted
that the other civil rights the Act guaranteed would be meaningless without the
right to ‘gain the economic wherewithal to enjoy or properly utilize them.’ ” (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964))).
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represents the achievement, or at a minimum, the path to the
colorblind meritocracy envisioned at the time of its creation by
dealing with chronic issues of unemployment, underemployment,
Title VII,
segregation in employment, and unequal pay.2
however, has not served this purpose.3 Those who believe that
Congress had such a purpose for Title VII blame McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green4 (“McDonnell Douglas II”) and the
Supreme Court for emasculating Title VII in disparate treatment
cases.5 McDonnell Douglas II, however, is not responsible for the
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2
Referring to the proposed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, key legislators
recognized that voting rights, school desegregation, and the desegregation of public
accommodations had little meaning in the absence of jobs:
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty
stomach. The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if
gainful employment is closed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a
restaurant or hotel is a shallow victory where one’s pockets are empty. The
principle of equal treatment under law can have little meaning if in
practice its benefits are denied the citizen.
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 26 (1963). Unemployment, employment by
occupation, and wage statistics showed nonwhite unemployment at more than twice
the rate of white unemployment. Id. at 27–28.
3
For example, in 1979, the continuing employment disparity led the United
States Supreme Court to describe the purpose of Title VII as opening to blacks
previously foreclosed employment opportunities, which was a foundation to the
Court’s decision to permit short-term private affirmative action in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979). The Court in Weber
specifically noted that the unemployment rates had not changed since Title VII
became law in 1964: “The problem that Congress addressed in 1964 remains with us.
In 1962, the nonwhite unemployment rate was 124% higher than the white rate.” Id.
at 204 n.4. “In 1978, the black unemployment rate was 129% higher.” Id.
Historically, black unemployment rates have continued to be twice as high as white
unemployment rates. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Data Retrieval: Labor Force Statistics
(CPS), BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab2.htm (check
box for “unemployment rate” under “not seasonally adjusted” column for the “White”
and “Black or African American” subcategories; then select “Retrieve data”) (last
modified July 8, 2015).
4
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5
The difficulty in proving disparate treatment is seen as a problem of
interpretation rather than a fundamental problem with Title VII’s structure. See
also Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and
Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial
Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1487–88 (1997) (“Most recently, in 1992, we
demonstrated how the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, had
significantly weakened Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by construing
procedural rules in a consistently pro-defendant manner.” (footnote omitted));
Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 315 (2010) (“Plaintiffs have
a hard row to hoe in proving unlawful discriminatory bias. Without the smoking gun
document, the blatant biased statement, or other direct evidence, plaintiffs must
rely on a variety of factual circumstances to weave a story that convinces the fact-
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weakness of disparate treatment claims. McDonnell Douglas II
is the consequence of the course set by Title VII’s authors: the
Eighty-eighth Congress. What has gone unacknowledged if not
unrecognized is the domination of the at-will employment
doctrine (“Doctrine”) over the creation of Title VII by the Eightyeighth Congress and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title
VII. Despite the rhetoric,6 because of the Doctrine’s influence,
Title VII did not supplant employment-at-will; Title VII was
conceived in the shadow of employment-at-will. By design, Title
VII is just an exception to the Doctrine.
The Court’s
interpretation of Title VII conforms to its design. Thus, Title VII
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finder that an employer’s actions constitute unlawful discrimination.”). See generally
William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81
(2009); Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109
(2007); Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell
Douglas Is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L.
REV. 743, 746 (2006); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An
Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every
Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003).
6
See generally Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997). Professor Selmi has observed
that the Supreme Court cannot see anything but the kind of discrimination that
brought on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 284, 335 (“Once the signs
denominating ‘colored’ and ‘white’ facilities were taken down, it has been difficult for
the Court to understand what legal problem remained.”). Both Title VII’s legislative
history and the Court’s pronouncements about Title VII’s purpose are rich sources of
rhetoric. See, e.g., EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant
purpose of the title, of course, is to root out discrimination in employment.”); Ford
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) (“The ‘primary objective’ of Title VII is
to bring employment discrimination to an end . . . .”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (“The primary purpose of Title VII was to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens.” (internal quotation mark omitted)); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“The emphasis of both the
language and the legislative history of the statute is on eliminating discrimination
in employment . . . .”); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283
(1976) (“The Act prohibits All racial discrimination in employment, without
exception for any group of particular employees . . . .” (emphasis added)); Johnson v.
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454, 457–58 (1975) (“It creates statutory rights
against invidious discrimination in employment and establishes a comprehensive
scheme for the vindication of those rights.”); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (“Congress enacted Title VII . . . to assure equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green (McDonnell Douglas II), 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (“Title VII tolerates no
racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”).
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has performed its intended and less heroic purpose of driving
only the worst forms of discrimination out of the workplace or
underground.
The purpose of this Article is to describe the actual
relationship between the Doctrine and Title VII as implemented
in the Court’s disparate treatment decisions. Title VII and the
Doctrine are not separate forces warring with each other. The
at-will employment doctrine guided the Court’s Title VII
disparate treatment jurisprudence, giving the maximum possible
latitude to employers because that was the Eighty-eighth
Congress’s intent.
Part I of this Article describes the at-will employment
doctrine as part of the constitutionally protected freedom of
contract.7 This Article argues that the Doctrine’s amazing power
derives in part from its longevity but mainly from its status as a
constitutionally protected freedom.8 As to the latter point, this
Article argues that a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions, Lochner
v. New York,9 Adair v. United States,10 and Coppage v. Kansas,11
emphasized the inviolability of the Doctrine and that future
efforts to create new rights for employees necessarily resulted in
weak exceptions to the Doctrine.12 With due deference to the
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7
As described in Part I, the Eighty-eighth Congress and the Court’s statements
and actions support the proposition that the at-will doctrine is a form of freedom of
contract protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which provided the
context for the crafting of a statutory limitation on that freedom in the form of Title
VII.
8
See infra Part I.
9
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
10
208 U.S. 161 (1908).
11
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
12
The fact that the Lochner decision’s hands-off stance to social legislation that
impacts laissez faire economics has been repudiated does not appear to have
impacted the point of Lochner: Individual liberty is a paramount constitutional
concern encompassing all of the elements of the Doctrine. See generally Lochner, 198
U.S. 45. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the majority made a specific point that
the legislation it approved—Washington state’s minimum-wage law for women—
impacted only what would be paid, not who would be hired or fired. 300 U.S. 379,
396–97 (1937) (“This statute does not compel anybody to pay anything. It simply
forbids employment at rates below those fixed as the minimum requirement of
health and right living.” (internal quotation mark omitted)). The more intimate
personal decision of who would be hired, who would be fired, and for what reasons
remained wholly intact.
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repudiation of the principle of unfettered freedom of contract by
the Court’s 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,13
employment-at-will remained untouched.
In Part II, this Article addresses the Doctrine’s successful
encounter with the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). In
Part II, this Article argues that the Doctrine remained largely
intact because of its dominant position vis-à-vis the new rights
conferred by the NLRA. Moreover, the encounter between the
Doctrine and the NLRA informed Title VII’s creation and
interpretation fifty years later. The earliest versions of Title VII
were meant to copy all of the features of the NLRA, including a
quasi-judicial body with broad investigative and enforcement
powers. Because of the encounter between the Doctrine and the
NLRA, Title VII was passed with a powerless Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
In Part III, this Article follows the Doctrine’s dominant role
in the creation of Title VII and the Court’s disparate treatment
jurisprudence. The focus of Part III is the McDonnell Douglas II
decision’s key role in perpetuating employment at-will’s
domination of Title VII. This Article argues that what has been
described as an “escalating subordination of federal employment
discrimination law to employment at will”14 does not fully credit
the Doctrine’s dominant position as the context for the creation
and interpretation of federal employment discrimination law.
The Doctrine’s dominance accounts for how little Title VII could
achieve in light of the Doctrine’s impact on the Eighty-eighth
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William R. Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, The Rise of “Pretext Plus,” and the
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to
Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 311
(1996) [hereinafter Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers]. Professor Corbett, for example,
argues that the turning point in favor of at-will happened after McDonnell Douglas
II. Thereafter, there has been an escalation of subordination. William R. Corbett, Of
Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time To Jettison
McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 361, 366–67 (1998) [hereinafter
Corbett, Of Babies]; Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra, at 332 (“The Supreme
Court’s subordination of employment discrimination law and its policies to the
employment-at-will doctrine can be traced to its Furnco opinion in 1978.”). This
Article argues that McDonnell Douglas II was the point where the Court first
described Title VII’s subordinate position to the Doctrine and that rather than an
escalation, there has been clarification. See infra Part III.A.
14
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Congress and how the Court, starting with McDonnell Douglas
II, acted to preserve the broadest latitude for employer
decision-making.
I.

AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT—DOCTRINE OF POWER

The Doctrine permits an employer to fire an employee at any
time “for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong, without being . . . guilty of [a] legal wrong.”15
The
Doctrine is more than a bland description of the employer’s right
to fire an employee. At-will employment is a doctrine of power.16
The Doctrine draws its strength from several sources: its
longevity,17 its role in a capitalist economy,18 and its relationship

15

Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884).
Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 307 (describing at-will
employment as “the ultimate manifestation” of power, property, and prerogative).
17
The issue of when at-will became a legal baseline in the American view of the
relationship between employer and employee has been the subject of some dispute.
Some prominent scholarship points to Horace G. Wood’s 1877 treatise as the origin
of the American doctrine and the genesis of its adoption as American law—thus
“Wood’s Rule.” Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125 (1976); J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974). Other
scholarship questions whether to credit Wood with announcing a new rule. Compare
Shapiro & Tune, supra (“H.G. Wood . . . formulated the employment at will rule in
his 1877 treatise on master-servant relationships . . . .”), with Mayer G. Freed &
Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of “Wood’s Rule” Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 551, 558 (1990) (“Horace Wood did not make up the rule of employment at will.
He just told it like it was.”). Other scholars, most notably Professor Deborah A.
Ballam, have convincingly shown that the idea of the terminability of employmentat-will has always been part of American law. Deborah A. Ballam, The Development
of the Employment At Will Rule Revisited: A Challenge to Its Origins as Based in the
Development of Advanced Capitalism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 75, 86 (1995)
(responding to Professor Feinman’s conclusion that at-will became the rule in New
York in the late 1890s and stating that “New York always followed the employment
at will doctrine”); Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding
Employment-at-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 91, 94 (1996) (“[A]bsent a contract to the contrary, employers in this country have
always had the ability to terminate employees at will.”).
18
The economic rationale for the Doctrine has been consistent: “[T]ermination
at will is the law’s development of a fundamental principle of the economy.”
Feinman, supra note 17, at 118.
16
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to freedom.19 Of these sources of power, the Doctrine, as a
constitutionally protected freedom of contract, provides a direct
link to Title VII’s creators.20
Of the “freedoms” in American law, a central freedom is
individual autonomy. In contrasting types of freedom, for
example, Eric Foner juxtaposes the autonomy of the individual,
liberal freedom with Republican freedom.21 Liberal freedom as
personal autonomy shields economic activity from governmental
interference.22 Republican freedom represents willingness to
subordinate personal autonomy to the public good.23 According to
Foner, “Individual self-fulfillment, unimpeded by government,
would become a central element of American freedom.”24 This
form of freedom manifested in the workplace in the mid-1800s as
factories and unskilled labor supplanted small workshops and
skilled artisans. Individuals exercised their freedom by entering
into voluntary agreements to work for employers.25 Employers
exercised their freedom by agreeing to the employment and
setting its terms.26
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19
ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 8 (2006) (“The public good
was less an ideal to be consciously pursued by government than the outcome of free
individuals’ pursuit of their myriad private ambitions.”) (describing the distinction
between competing ideologies of freedom at the time of the American Revolution,
thereby highlighting what would become the dominant concept of freedom).
20
Senators debating Title VII in April 1964 specifically raised an employer’s
right to hire and fire at-will as a reason not to pass Title VII. See 110 CONG. REC.
7253 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“The bill is designed to compel employers to
hire nonwhites in specific cases, whether they wish to hire them or not; is it not?”);
id. at 7257 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“I want those who are engaged in business to
be allowed to determine whom they shall employ. . . . I believe in free enterprise—
not bureaucratic control of business. The pending bill would remove the power from
employers to hire, promote, and discharge their own employees.”); id. at 7267
(statement of Sen. Morton) (“The right to fire, it seems to me, is an important
right.”) (noting that the abridgment of that right because individuals thought they
had been discriminated against would lead to the downfall of American industry).
21
FONER, supra note 19.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 7–8.
24
Id. at 20. Professor Richard A. Epstein makes the same argument: Personal
autonomy equals freedom. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1992) (“An antidiscrimination law
is the antithesis of freedom of contract, a principle that allows all persons to do
business with whomever they please for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at
all.”).
25
FONER, supra note 19, at 59.
26
Id.
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As a central element of American freedom, between 1890 and
1910, it has been said that “at-will” began to take on the name of
“freedom of contract.”27 The Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v.
New York28 set the stage for employers by invalidating a New
York labor law that prohibited employers of bakers from
requiring bakers to work more than sixty hours per week on the
grounds that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
liberty interest of freedom of contract.29 The Lochner Court
determined that “[t]here is no reasonable ground for interfering
with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by
determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.”30
Indeed, the Lochner majority strongly signaled its disagreement
with the idea of any interference in the terms on which people
might agree to purchase and sell labor.31
The Lochner Court also crafted its decision as if employers
and employees were equal bargaining partners.32 The Court
maintained this pretense of equality in two Lochner-era labor
cases: Adair v. United States33 and Coppage v. Kansas.34 In
Adair, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company fired a
locomotive fireman solely because of his union membership. The
termination involved a federal law applicable to railway
employers prohibiting them from discriminating against
employees because of union membership.35 In other words, the
statute created a protected class based on voluntary union
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27
Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the
United States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 116 (1982).
28
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
29
Id. at 52–53 (“The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty
protected by [the Fourteenth Amendment] . . . .”).
30
Id. at 57.
31
Id. at 63 (“This interference on the part of the legislatures of the several
states with the ordinary trades and occupations of the people seems to be on the
increase.”); id. at 61 (“Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting the hours
in which grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere
meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual . . . .”). As Justice
Holmes’s dissent recognized, Lochner went well beyond working-hour limits for
bakers in establishing laissez-faire as the economic theory of the Constitution. Id. at
75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 61 (majority opinion) (“The act is not, within any fair meaning of the
term, a health law, but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both
employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as
they may think best . . . .”).
33
208 U.S. 161 (1908).
34
236 U.S. 1 (1915).
35
Adair, 208 U.S. at 167–69.
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membership and curtailed the employer’s right to terminate
employment because of union membership. The Adair Court
recognized that freedom of contract was a liberty interest under
the Fifth Amendment and held the federal law prohibiting the
termination of an employee because of union membership
unconstitutional because of the at-will nature of the
In doing so, the Court gave the following
employment.36
description of the nature of the at-will employment relationship:
[I]t is not within the functions of government . . . to compel any
person, in the course of his business and against his will, to
accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel
any person, against his will, to perform personal services for
another. The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms
as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he
will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. . . . In
all such particulars the employer and the employee have
equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality
is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no
government can legally justify in a free land.37

36

C M
Y K

given the protections
or involuntary class
VII, the Adair Court
likely never within

04/08/2016 13:04:55

Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 174–75 (emphasis added). Equally noteworthy,
that were ultimately granted on the basis of voluntary
membership in the National Labor Relations Act and Title
implied that class-based legislation was iniquitous and
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers. Id. at 179–80.
38
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 26.
39
Id. at 14.
40
Id. at 7.
37
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In 1915, the Coppage decision amplified the Adair holding by
rendering unconstitutional state legislation that impinged on atwill prerogatives when the issue involved union membership.38
Moreover, the Coppage Court elevated at-will employment to the
highest rank of constitutional liberty and property interests.39 In
Coppage, the employer fired an employee because he refused to
sign a contract to leave his union.40 The State of Kansas
prosecuted the termination under a state statute making it
unlawful for any employer “to coerce, require, demand, or
influence any person or persons to enter into any agreement,
either written or verbal, not to join or become or remain a
member of any labor organization or association, as a condition of
such
person
or
persons
securing
employment,
or
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continuing . . . employment.”41 The Court held the state law
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.42
The most striking feature of Coppage is the extent to which
the Court elevated at-will employment in the spectrum of
constitutional freedoms and the complete denigration of the
existence of any constitutional protection for membership in a
union. In defense of the at-will principle the Court declared:
The principle is fundamental and vital. Included in the right of
personal liberty and the right of private property—partaking of
the nature of each—is the right to make contracts for the
acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of
personal employment, by which labor and other services are
exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be
struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial
impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional
sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the
capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the vast majority of
persons have no other honest way to begin to acquire property,
save by working for money.43

41
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Id. at 6.
See id. at 13.
43
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
44
Id. at 19.
45
Id. at 20 (“And the liberty of making contracts does not include a liberty to
procure employment from an unwilling employer . . . .”).
46
Id. at 21. The Coppage Court’s discussion of the employer’s right to know
whom he employed deserves some emphasis. In 1915, it was perfectly appropriate
for an employer to ask about union involvement and fire an employee for refusing to
quit the union. In other words, disloyalty to the employer fit within the fair exercise
of the employer’s freedom because of the at-will doctrine. In 1973, the Court in
McDonnell Douglas II discussed disloyalty as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for refusing to hire Green. See discussion infra Part III.B.
42
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As to any protection that might be afforded union
membership, the Court determined, “if freedom of contract is to
be preserved, the employer must be left at liberty to decide for
himself whether [union] membership by his employee is
consistent with the satisfactory performance of the duties of the
Indeed, true freedom of contract required
employment.”44
employers to know through open and frank dealings whether an
employee belonged to a union,45 and for an employer to demand
that an employee abjure unionism as a condition of employment
“is not to ask him to give up any part of his constitutional
freedom.”46
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Although the Court’s 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish diluted the full strength of Lochnerian freedom of
contract that flows through Adair and Coppage, it left the most
intimate aspects of the decision to hire and fire wholly intact.
Repudiating but not overruling Lochner, the West Coast Hotel
Court declared that freedom of contract was not unfettered.47 On
the other hand, in declaring that a minimum wage law was not
an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty, the Court clarified
that setting a minimum wage was not an infringement on the
right to hire or fire at-will: “This statute does not compel
anybody to pay anything.”48 The statute only set the minimum
wage if a willing buyer and seller of labor made an agreement.49
This language paraphrases the Coppage Court’s declaration that
“the liberty of making contracts does not include a liberty to
procure employment from an unwilling employer.”50 After West
Coast Hotel, the ability to hire and fire at will remained
constitutionally protected.
II. THE DOCTRINE ENCOUNTERS THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT—A DRESS REHEARSAL FOR TITLE VII

47
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W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391–92 (1937).
Id. at 396 (quoting Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 570 (1923)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
49
Id.
50
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 20.
51
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
52
Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 318–20.
53
See supra text accompanying notes 36–43.
54
JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 44–
66 (1983) (discussing how the NLRA’s apparent onesidedness in favor of employees
was balanced by certain limitations on protections for concerted activities,
particularly the subjectivity which Congress invited the courts to employ in
construing section 7 which made striking a legal form of bargaining over the terms
of employment).
48
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The New Deal’s National Labor Relations Act51 (“NLRA”)
challenged the complete domination of the constitutional right of
freedom of contract in the form of the at-will employment
The NLRA’s apparent onesidedness seemed to
doctrine.52
repudiate the principles of Adair and Coppage by creating an
imbalance in the complete equality of right to set the terms of a
labor bargain.53 Regardless of whether Congress intended the
complete repudiation of Adair and Coppage,54 the 1937 NLRB v.
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Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.55 and the 1938 NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co.56 decisions showed that the NLRA was
not really that much of a challenge for the Doctrine.57
In Jones, a divided Court upheld the NLRA as a proper
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.58 However,
Jones left Adair and Coppage in place.59 Consistent with the
West Coast Hotel decision, according to the Jones Court, the
character of the NLRA, which did not attempt to compel
agreements between employers and employees, made Adair and
Coppage inapposite. In words that the Eighty-eighth Congress
would echo almost fifty years later in defining the scope of the
EEOC’s authority under Title VII,60 the Jones Court reassured
employers of the limits of the NLRA and of the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”):
The act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of
the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The
employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or
coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and
representation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled
to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of
discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons than
such intimidation and coercion.61

Jones, on its face, guarantees not only the continued vitality
of at-will, but promises that the Court would take a protectionist
view of the at-will power.
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301 U.S. 1 (1937).
304 U.S. 333 (1938).
57
Both Professor Corbett and Professor Atleson discuss the tension between the
at-will doctrine and the NLRA in decisions starting with Mackay Radio in 1938, but
neither focuses on the Court’s 1937 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. decision as the
roadmap for what was to come.
58
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 31–43.
59
Id. at 45.
60
See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963) (“Similarly, management
prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent
possible. Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be
interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required in
discrimination practices.”).
61
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added). The Jones
Court also seemed to foreshadow and highlight its view of the narrow scope of the
NLRA when it added, “It would seem that when employers freely recognize the right
of their employees to their own organizations and their unrestricted right of
representation there will be much less occasion for controversy in respect to the free
and appropriate exercise of the right of selection and discharge.” Id. at 46.
56
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A year later, in Mackay Radio, the Court honored its
promise.62 The Court protected the employer’s right of selection
and discharge by authorizing employers to offer permanent
employment to strike-breakers, those who the NLRB could not
require an employer to discharge in favor of returning economic
strikers.63 The key language identifying the Court’s basic
assumption about the NLRA is the Court’s statement that,
although the NLRA prohibits interference with the right to
strike, “it does not follow that an employer . . . has lost the right
to protect and continue his business by supplying places left
vacant by strikers.”64
The employer’s “right to protect and continue his business”
assumes an employer specific set of rights, which runs directly
from Lochner, Adair, and Coppage. Although the rights may be
camouflaged or appear under an alias,65 the disguises of these
employer-specific rights are reasonably penetrable. As to the
scope of the right, it is so broad and powerful that no federal
enactment can truly interrupt “the normal exercise of the right of
the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.”66
Accordingly, rather than assuming that a new federal “right”
requires the given context to make an accommodating
adjustment, the reverse is true. New “right” is by nature fragile
and the new “right” will be accommodated to give the existing
constitutional freedom the broadest possible scope. The NLRA
did not really challenge existing management prerogatives, and,
as this Article argues below, by design, neither did Title VII.

Title VII disparate-treatment jurisprudence favors the atwill employment principle of broad employer discretion. So,
rather than a remedial statute, broadly construed to advance
equality, Title VII is most accurately seen as a limited incursion
on employer’s discretion.
Short of direct evidence of
discrimination, “the normal exercise of the right of the employer

62
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See generally NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
Id. at 345–46. It is now axiomatic that Mackay Radio effectively distorted, if
not destroyed, the NLRA’s protection of the right to strike by depriving the economic
strike of any potency. ATLESON, supra note 54, at 19.
64
Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
65
Id.; Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 308.
66
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45–46.
63
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to select its employees or to discharge them”67 has not changed.
In reality, Title VII was never more than “just another tort
exception to employment at will.”68
A.

At-Will’s Domination of Title VII—Legislative History

The Eighty-eighth Congress set Title VII’s initial limits as an
exception to the Doctrine in 1964. Most scholarship overlooks
this fact, or fails to recognize its significance.69 The holes in
scholarship may also be “[b]ecause employment at will often is
referred to by one of its many aliases, such as management
prerogatives, it has not always been recognized.”70 Nevertheless,
the fact remains that Congress subordinated Title VII to at-will
employment by specific intent ab initio.
The Eighty-eighth Congress literally stole the Court’s lines
from Jones, promising to protect “the normal exercise of the right
of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.”71
Accordingly, as Title VII left the House of Representatives for the
Senate in late 1963, Congress emphasized the limits on the
EEOC and the scope of Title VII:

67
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Id. at 45.
Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 311. Title VII’s status as an
icon of the civil rights era seems to be responsible for the fact that very few
acknowledge Title VII for what it is. Those who realize that McDonnell Douglas II is
correct do so with anguish. See generally McGinley, supra note 1, at 231.
69
Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 312–14 (“[T]he hoary
doctrine is on the offensive against federal employment discrimination law, rapidly
regaining whatever territory was once taken from it by the federal statutes.”)
(taking the perspective that the at-will doctrine is uncommonly resilient in the face
of laws like Title VII and wondering at the source of the doctrine’s strength).
Professor Corbett is not commenting on the impact of at-will on the abysmal success
rates of race and national origin discrimination cases under Title VII. Rather, the
issue is more general, and Professor Corbett points out, but does not really define,
the borders of the territory Title VII conquered by at-will.
70
Id. at 308.
71
See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45–46; see also supra note 60
and accompanying text.
68
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It must also be stressed that the Commission must confine its
activities to correcting abuse, not promoting equality with
mathematical certainty. In this regard, nothing in the title
permits a person to demand employment.
Of greater
importance, the Commission will only jeopardize its continued
existence if it seeks to impose forced racial balance upon
employers or labor unions.
Similarly, management
prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to
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the greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of employers and
labor organizations must not be interfered with except to the
limited extent that correction is required in discrimination
practices.72

This description of the primacy of at-will employment
captures the narrow scope Congress intended for legitimate
EEOC action and the narrow scope of Title VII itself. The use of
well-known aliases, “management prerogatives,” and “internal
affairs of employers” affirmed at-will as the dominant context in
which Title VII should function. Should there be confusion about
the “abuse” Congress intended Title VII to correct, “to the limited
extent that correction is required” Congress defined “abuse” as
“the most serious type[] of discrimination.”73 This language is the
better source for an accurate statement of purpose for Title VII;
there is no rhetoric or wishful thinking—both of which, overtime,
have superimposed a purpose unrelated to the mandate Title
VII’s designers imbedded in its structure. The purpose of Title
72

H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963).
Id. at 18, 29. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has no preamble stating its
purpose, and neither do any of its component Titles. A statement of the purpose and
content of the legislation that would become the Act comes from House Report 914,
November 20, 1963 on House Resolution 7152. According to the report, “The bill, as
amended, is designed primarily to protect and provide more effective means to
enforce the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at
16. The General Statement to the report describes the House Report:
H.R. 7152 . . . is designed as a step toward eradicating significant areas of
discrimination on a nationwide basis. It is general in application and
national in scope.
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and
consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities.
There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership provided by
the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome
problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local
resolution of other forms of discrimination.
It is, however, possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation
which prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious
types of discrimination. This H.R. 7152, as amended, would achieve in a
number of related areas. . . . [i]t would prohibit discrimination in
employment . . . .
Id. at 18. The report’s section-by-section analysis of Title VII states: “The purpose of
this title is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national
origin.” Id. at 26. See generally Selmi, supra note 6, at 284, 335. Professor Selmi has
observed that the Supreme Court cannot see anything but the kind of discrimination
that brought on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. (“Once the signs denominating
‘colored’ and ‘white’ facilities were taken down, it has been difficult for the Court to
understand what legal problem remained.”).
73
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VII is not the eradication of employment discrimination in
general. Title VII’s purpose is the eradication of the most serious
discrimination and the retention of employer discretion. Having
outlined this purpose for Title VII, Congress assured that Title
VII would remain true to its purpose by limiting Title VII’s
enforcement agency, the EEOC, and by failing to deal with the
issue of causation in any way that would have created a truly
new “right” beyond the Doctrine’s reach.74
The form and function of the NLRB influenced Congress to
minimize the power of the EEOC as an enforcement agency. For
example, the initial proposal for what became Title VII was
practically a carbon copy of the NLRA.75 It included a quasijudicial administrative body, like the NLRB, with power to
adjudicate claims and enforce compliance.76 Apparently mindful
of arguments that the NLRB’s powers unconstitutionally
transgressed the Seventh Amendment,77 however, legislators
early and successfully advocated for a powerless EEOC.78
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74
The author picked the form of the EEOC and the issue of causation as the
issues that most readily expose the historical continuity of the at-will doctrine’s
influence on federal fair employment practices legislation. Given constraints of
space, the author chose not to discuss the other manifestations of congressional
intent to limit Title VII’s impact on traditional management prerogatives and union
freedoms such as the right to test, the preservation of union seniority, the
prohibition against quotas, and the decision to limit Title VII to future wrongs. For a
more detailed discussion of these issues, see generally Chuck Henson, Title VII
Works—That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 41
(2012).
75
Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 85 (1964).
76
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963).
77
In Jones, one of the challenges to the constitutionality of the NLRA was that
the NLRB deprived employers of the right to a jury trial because the challenged
NLRB order not only reinstated employees, but also granted them back pay. NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937). The Jones Court reasoned
that because the back pay award was incident to equitable relief the Seventh
Amendment did not apply. Id. at 48–49.
78
The author quotes legislative history when describing how the legislature
rejected an EEOC that operated like the NLRB:
The historic safeguard of trial before an impartial judiciary would be
abandoned in this bill by the majority in favor of hearings before a newly
created NLRB-type administrative tribunal, with only a limited right of
review in a court of appeals. It is unfortunate that the committee in its zeal
to protect one civil right has seen fit, unnecessarily, to cast aside other
fundamental and well-established rights which are at least of equal
importance.
Henson, supra note 74, at 71 n.145 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We regard
the modern development of trial by administrative tribunal as a threat to the
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As to creating a new “right” beyond the Doctrine’s reach,
Congress ultimately did nothing. Accepting the premise that
“any or no reason” defines the Doctrine’s reach for hiring,
promoting, and firing, a new “right” of equal or greater power
needed to either limit the Doctrine’s application to white men or
replace the Doctrine altogether if Title VII’s purpose was to
eradicate employment discrimination in general. Exempting all
but white males from the Doctrine was never proposed as a
solution,79 nor was replacing the Doctrine altogether.

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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liberties of every citizen. It is a reactionary device in the truest sense of that word.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). By the time Title VII left the House of
Representatives for the Senate in late 1963, the House had already emasculated the
EEOC, limiting its role to investigation and conciliation. Discussing the reasons for
depriving the EEOC of quasi-judicial powers, the representatives noted that their
version of Title VII gave employers and unions “a fairer forum to establish
innocence” with the federal judiciary as the final arbiter of discrimination. H.R. REP.
NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963). The choice between a quasi-judicial EEOC and the
federal judiciary has a peculiar significance in the protection of at-will’s primacy. A
crusading EEOC could have ignored the common law given a broad mandate to
eliminate employment discrimination. On the other hand, for judges, at-will was the
context in which their decisions were regularly made. Accordingly, the designation of
courts as the final authority on the existence of discrimination emphasized at-will’s
primacy under the alias of “a fairer forum.” See id.
79
Such a solution ran contrary to the idea of a colorblind meritocracy and would
have called for the kinds of special treatment or favoritism for blacks that legislators
expressly disavowed to preserve the ability to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into
law. See Civil Rights Act of 1963: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2769 (1963) (noting that, when questioned about preferential
treatment and quotas, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy specifically testified
that there was no intent “to grant any preferential treatment to Negroes”); 110
CONG. REC. 7253 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“The bill is designed to compel
employers to hire nonwhites in specific cases, whether they wish to hire them or not;
is it not?”); id. (statement of Sen. Case) (“It does not require anybody to hire a
particular individual. It does not require anybody to hire someone who cannot do the
job necessary.”); id. at 7267 (statement of Sen. Ellender) (“It is obvious from this case
and all that has gone before it that the Negroes are not interested in equal
employment opportunity, but in effect desire preferred treatment.”). As the Senate
prepared to vote on the final version of H.R. 7152, which would become the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Senator Williams caused his correspondence with one of the chief
proponents of H.R. 7152, Senator Dirksen, to be printed in the Congressional
Record. Id. at 14,329. Senator Williams asked Senator Dirksen three questions about
whether Title VII required quotas. Senator Dirksen responded, “The Senate
substitute bill expressly provides that an employer does not have to maintain any
employment ratio, regardless of the racial ration in the community.” Id. (“Under the
Senate substitute bill an employer is not required to hire any person who is less
qualified than other job applicants. . . . The Senate substitute bill does not affect the
right of an employer to discharge inefficient employees, regardless of their race and
of the effect of the discharge on the racial balance in his employment.”); id. at 12,723
(noting that Senator Humphrey’s remarks concerning persistent claims that Title
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A simple definition is sufficient. Let us refer to employment
discrimination as any nonobjective behavior on the part of an
employer toward an employee or potential employee, which
reflects some intuitive negative evaluation (prejudice) of the
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VII required racial balancing or preferential treatment had been addressed by the
inclusion of a specific statement in Title VII that it did not require quotas or
preferences).
80
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 45–46.
81
Id. at 45 (“The [NLRA] does not compel agreements between employers and
employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever.”).
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Prior to 1963, Congress attempted one large-scale federal
effort at creating a new employment right. That effort was the
NLRA. The NLRA, however, did not replace the Doctrine.
According to the Jones Court, at-will remained entirely whole
unless and until the NLRB proved that the employer’s decision
was actually a pretext for intimidation or coercion related to the
exercise of an employee’s rights under the NLRA.80 The Doctrine,
therefore, remained the same with the minor addition of “except”
where the NLRB proved that “any reason or no reason” was
actually hiding an anti-union motivation. What the NLRA did
provide for was the exercise of the freedom of contract where
parties of more or less equal power could bargain to replace the
Doctrine. That unions could convince management to agree to
termination “for cause” and give up the right to termination for
“any or no reason” was a creature of the voluntary agreement
between management and labor under the NLRA’s shadow, not a
statutory carve-out or displacement of the Doctrine.81
To the degree that the NLRA was an example of how
Congress might have created a specific replacement for the
Doctrine, the Eighty-eighth Congress followed the NLRA’s
example and left the Doctrine intact despite two opportunities to
limit the Doctrine’s impact on Title VII. One opportunity to limit
at-will’s reach would have been defining discrimination in the
text of the statute to require objective grounds for employment
decisions. The second opportunity to limit the Doctrine would
have been to describe causation so that every employment
decision, from hiring to firing, had to be justified as being made
for cause.
A definition of discrimination that would have made an
employer liable for “nonobjective behavior” was proposed:
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employee’s race to the extent that the employer, when
confronted with a manpower need, will either not use the
employee, underutilize him and/or undercompensate him.82

Congress did not adopt this definition.
The Eighty-eighth Congress also had the opportunity to limit
the Doctrine when for cause became a part of the debate over
how an applicant or employee might successfully achieve a job,
promotion, reinstatement, and back pay, hereinafter “meaningful
relief,” in compensation for unlawful discrimination.
To
paraphrase, under an early version of section 706(g), a claimant
could not receive meaningful relief if the adverse employment
decision was “for any reason other than discrimination on
account of race.”83 In a subsequent iteration, section 706(g) read
that no court could award meaningful relief if the adverse
employment decision was “for cause.”84 In its final iteration in
the House, one of Title VII’s sponsors amended section 706(g) to
replace “cause” with “any reason other than discrimination on
account of race.”85 In other words, an employer avoids an award
of meaningful relief by having “any reason” for an adverse
employment decision where a claimant cannot prove the decision
was “on account of race.”86 This conclusion fits within Title VII’s

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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82
Equal Employment Opportunity Hearings Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor
of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 88th Cong. 203–04 (1963) (testimony of Walter B.
Lewis, Director, Job Development, Washington Urban League).
83
STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., REP. ON CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 at 86 (Comm. Print 1963).
84
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 12 (1963).
85
110 CONG. REC. 2567 (1964). Representative Celler explained the amendment
was made “to specify cause” to assure that a court “cannot find any violation of the
act which is based on facts other—and I emphasize ‘other’—than discrimination on
the grounds of race.” Id.
86
The paucity of legislative history on this particular language in H.R. 7251 has
been cause for confusion. The language could be read to mean that unless claimants
proved that race, for example, was the only reason for the adverse decision, they
would receive no meaningful relief. Once H.R. 7152 reached the Senate, an effort
was made to clarify that a section 703 unfair employment practice arose “solely
because of” a proscribed characteristic. 110 CONG. REC. 13,837–38 (1964). Senator
McClellan of Arkansas proposed adding the language “solely” so that section 703
would not “be a dragnet, a catchall, to leave something uncertain for a court to
interpret.” Id. at 13,837 (internal quotation marks omitted). In support, Senator
Long of Louisiana explained:
I cannot for the life of me understand why someone would want to insist on
leaving out the word ‘solely,’ because my impression was that if it were
desired to hire someone because he was a brother-in-law or a first cousin, a
person could not complain that he failed to get the job because of his race.
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purpose as described by Congress—the elimination of the worst
kinds of discrimination and the preservation of the maximum
extent of management discretion in decision making.
B.

The Doctrine’s Domination of Title VII—Griggs and
McDonnell Douglas II

In 1973, the Supreme Court decided its first disparate
treatment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.87 In that
case, the Court created the infamous burden shifting analysis.
With minimum factual allegations, the prima facie case, a
claimant could establish a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination subject to an employer’s assertion of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.88
In light of the history of the Doctrine’s dominant position,
express legislative intent to maintain that dominance, and
specific statutory language prohibiting the award of meaningful
relief where race is not the only reason for an adverse decision,
the burden shifting analysis and its results were inevitable.
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Id. Senator Lausche from Ohio agreed with Senator Long that the addition of the
word solely was a mere clarification that the phrase “because of” really meant “only
because of.” See id. at 13,837–38. Because the Senate did not add the word solely to
Title VII, it has been argued that sole causation could not have been Congress’s
intent. See Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 296–97 (1982). That
argument, however, is based on the distinction between what the author calls
meaningful relief, also known as affirmative relief, and injunctive or negative relief,
or what the author calls meaningless relief: No injunctive relief under Title VII in
this context would ever pay the rent or put food on the table. Nevertheless, proof in a
mixed motives case would allow for injunctive relief; thus, the absence of sole
causation was never a bar to all relief. Although the Senate rejected “solely because
of,” no Senator ever told the Senator from Louisiana that he misunderstood Title
VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,837–38 (1964). In fact, amendments in the Senate
actually diminished Title VII’s ability to contest the at-will doctrine’s domination of
the employment relationship. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The
Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1471–72 (2003)
(concluding that the primary work of the pivotal legislators in the Senate was to
blunt the impact of Title VII on the north, where their constituencies dominated job
opportunities, both management and labor, and discrimination was de facto rather
than de jure).
87
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
88
Id. at 802–03.
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Nevertheless, McDonnell Douglas II has been and continues
to be the subject of intense criticism. Among other reasons,89
academics and jurists fault the Court for creating the burdenshifting device when there was no need.90 This criticism ignores
how the lower courts actually implemented their understanding
of Title VII before 1973. They were already engaging in a
method of analysis similar to burden shifting by giving due
emphasis to the reasons employers voiced to defend their
employment decisions and weighing the plaintiff’s prima facie
case in light of the employer’s rationale.91 The criticism also
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89
Other principal criticisms of McDonnell Douglas II are that it diverts courts
from the issue of discrimination, that there was no statutory basis for the Court’s
interpretation of Title VII and that it sets up an illusory distinction between direct
and indirect evidence which makes disparate treatment cases unnecessarily difficult
to prove. See Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell
Douglas Is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L.
REV. 743, 762 (2006); Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV.
U. L. REV. 503, 519–24 (2007).
90
This argument might be summarized as asserting that the parties, the
district courts, and the circuit courts were doing just fine trying disparate treatment
cases without the burden shifting format.
91
See Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 455 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir.
1972) (“In discrimination cases the law with respect to burden of proof is wellsettled.
The plaintiff is required only to make out a prima facie case of unlawful
discrimination at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the
existence of any disparities.”). Hodgson, an age-discrimination case, was unique in
that the employer asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to hire
as affirmative defenses. See also Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th
Cir. 1970) (“To rebut testimony from specific black applicants for employment
introduced by [the plaintiff], the Company produced evidence tending to show valid
business reasons supporting its refusal to hire each of them.”); Aros v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (concerning a defendant
rebutting a prima facie case of sex discrimination based on hair length by asserting
that failure to hire long-haired student interns was based on poor overall grooming
and slack performance and defendant’s decision to phase out the student program
for business reasons); Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or.
1970) (“After the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence has made a prima facie case of
discrimination, it was in order to look to the defendant for an explanation.”).
Admittedly, the early cases demonstrate a certain amount of confusion. In some
cases, plaintiffs attempt to prove that race, age, or gender was the sole cause of the
adverse employment action. Courts responded by finding that a proscribed
characteristic only needed to be the principal cause. There appear to be no cases
where a defendant formally assumed a burden of proof for their legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, except where, possibly in confusion, a defendant pled its
reasons as an affirmative defense. See Hodgson, 455 F.2d at 822 (concerning an
employer asserting legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, that the job was too
strenuous, and that the plaintiff agreed that the plaintiff was not qualified because
the job was too strenuous, as affirmative defenses). Accordingly, as with the modern
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, courts merely required the defendant to
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completely ignores the impact of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.92 on
disparate treatment cases. The Griggs decision interrupted the
normal development of Title VII as a limited exception to at-will
employment in disparate treatment cases. The reaction to
Griggs in the lower courts required the Court’s McDonnell
Douglas II decision to realign disparate treatment jurisprudence
with congressional intent and specific statutory language.
1.

Any or No Reason—Disparate Treatment Before Griggs

In a number of pre-1973 disparate treatment cases,93 lower
courts highlighted Title VII’s limited power to circumscribe
employer decision-making: “It must be remembered that so far
as the Civil Rights Act goes, the employer may discharge or
refuse to reemploy for any reason, except discrimination or
because of practices made unlawful under Title VII.”94 At-will
was present under the alias of “for any reason.” Reasons which
defendants asserted as not discriminatory included nonviolent
unlawful protest against an employer,95 “inability” to get along
with others,96 “lax attitude” toward work,97 reliance on bad
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respond to the plaintiff’s case based on better access to the reasons for adverse
employment action. Id. (“Once the plaintiff has made out his prima facie case we
look to the defendant for an explanation since he is in a position to know whether he
failed to hire a person for reasons which would exonerate him.”); Gates, 326 F. Supp.
at 399 (“After the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence has made a prima facie case of
discrimination, it was in order to look to the defendant for an explanation. A
defendant in these cases knows whether or not it failed to hire a person for reasons
which would exonerate the defendant under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g).”); Marquez v.
Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1162 n.10 (8th Cir. 1971) (“It is obvious
that plaintiff was refused, denied, reemployment because of her civil rights activity.
The record reveals no other possible motive. The refusal of the Board to specify is
silent witness to the discrimination.” (quoting Williams v. Sumter Sch. Dist. No. 2,
255 F. Supp. 397, 403 (D.S.C. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92
401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
93
The group of cases includes those under Title VII for race, national origin, and
gender discrimination, and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967.
94
Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Mo. 1970)
(emphasis added); see also Barnes v. Lerner Shops of Tex., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 617,
622 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
95
McDonnell-Douglas, 318 F. Supp. at 850.
96
Barnes, 323 F. Supp. at 622 (“It is apparent from the record that defendant’s
reasons for discharging plaintiff were motivated solely and simply by the plaintiff’s
inability to get along with her fellow employees and because of the lax attitude
which she demonstrated in carrying out her duties.”); see also Tidwell v. Am. Oil Co.,
332 F. Supp. 424, 435 (D. Utah 1971) (“Defendant characterizes the [evidence of
friction with subordinates and supervisors] as the culmination of many problems
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references from prior employers,98 and a policy of hiring only
internal candidates.99 Courts recognized that these kinds of
reasons for adverse employment action contained a level of
subjectivity which might provide a safe harbor for discriminatory
animus.100 Consequently, and descriptive of the strength of atwill, no claimant successfully argued that subjectivity standing
by itself was grounds for invalidating an employer’s arguably
subjective rationale for an adverse employment decision.101
The outcome of asserting these traditional at-will grounds
for adverse employment action depended on the strength of the
claimant’s case in light of the employer’s reason.102 In some cases
employers prevailed.103 In some cases employers failed. They
failed, not because their at-will reasons were questioned in some
general sense, but because it was clear that the reason given was
false or pretextual.104 Had this method of decision making
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with plaintiff and a clear indication of sufficient inability to get along with others as
to justify her termination.”).
97
Barnes, 323 F. Supp. at 622; see also Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970).
98
Parham, 433 F.2d at 428 (“Nothing in the record indicates that the
[defendant’s] background investigation of [the plaintiff] was anything other than a
good faith effort to explore his prior employment experience.”).
99
Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or. 1970).
100
In McDonnell Douglas I, for example, the Eighth Circuit specifically
commented on subjectivity with reference to McDonnell Douglas’s stated reasons for
refusing to rehire Green. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th
Cir. 1972) (McDonnell Douglas I) (“Our prior decisions make clear that, in cases
presenting questions of discriminatory hiring practices, employment decisions based
on subjective, rather than objective, criteria carry little weight in rebutting charges
of discrimination.”). In Parham, the defendant relied on negative references from
prior employers. In approving the finding that failing the background check provided
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to reject plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit noted
that the EEOC’s investigatory report in the case “questioned the objectivity of the
recommendation from [a prior employer], noting that it may have reflected racial
bias.” Parham, 433 F.2d at 428 n.6.
101
Parham, 433 F.2d at 428; McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973)
(“The [Eighth Circuit] seriously underestimated the rebuttal weight to which
[McDonnell Douglas’s] reasons were entitled.”).
102
Barnes, 323 F. Supp. at 622 (“It is apparent from the record that defendant’s
reasons for discharging plaintiff were motivated solely and simply by the plaintiff’s
inability to get along with her fellow employees . . . . The burden of proving reasons
apart from these was on the plaintiff. This she failed to do.”).
103
Id.; see also Parham, 433 F.2d at 428; Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348
F. Supp. 661, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
104
In Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., the court acknowledged that a policy of
only hiring internally “does not violate [Title VII].” 326 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Or.
1970). Yet, given the fact that the employer advertised openings outside of the
company and filled an opening with a white internal hire whose “background was
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continued an uninterrupted evolution, the Court would not have
been required to put its imprimatur on burden shifting and the
continuing vitality of at-will when it did. There was, however, an
interruption: Griggs v. Duke Power Co.105
The need for Supreme Court intervention arose in 1973
because of how lower courts reacted to Griggs.106 In establishing
disparate impact as a viable cause of action under Title VII, the
Griggs Court focused on the need for job related testing and
policies and burdened the employer with showing business
necessity for those tests and policies.107 The decision seemed to
authorize the transformation of disparate treatment in that,
according to the Court, “Congress has placed on the employer the
burden of showing that any given requirement must have a
manifest relationship to the employment in question.”108 This
declaration contains two concepts anathema to employment-atwill by (1) providing an objective basis for an employment
decision and (2) shifting the burden to the employer to prove that
objective basis. The following Section describes the attempt to
invoke Griggs in disparate treatment cases.
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conspicuously unimpressive in comparison with that of the [black] plaintiff,” the
plaintiff prevailed. Id. at 398. In Tidwell v. American Oil Co., the court did not
question the validity of an employer’s ability to terminate for failure to get along
with others, or the basic proposition that a termination demonstrably carried out
under standard operating procedure would negate an inference of discrimination.
332 F. Supp. 424, 435 (D. Utah 1971). The court found, however, that the employer
hired the plaintiff to get a job done without regard to getting along with her
subordinates and her termination “was [not] such a routine firing.” Id.
105
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
106
Griggs dealt with the impact of facially neutral job qualification policies,
including educational requirements and job testing, in the specific context of a
southern employer with a long history of segregating its black employees into the
lowest paying menial jobs. Within that context, the Court pronounced that
employment policies, specifically job testing, measure a person’s ability to do a job
rather than measuring the person. Id. at 436. According to the Griggs Court, Title
VII disallowed those “employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.” Id. at 432. In the context of job testing, the Court observed: “The Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.” Id. at 431. The last sentence of this footnote
may be important enough to add to the body of the text. Effectively, it explains the
caveat that disparate treatment carves out of the at-will doctrine.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 432.
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Nullification of “Any or No Reason”—Disparate Treatment
Under Griggs

Although the Griggs Court never explicitly contrasted
“objective” with “subjective” reasoning for employment decisions,
lower courts appear to have focused on Griggs’ coded description
of objectivity: that employment procedures have a “manifest
relationship to the employment in question.”109 Lower courts,
already sensitized to the issue of subjectivity in employer
decision making,110 took the “manifest relationship” requirement
as their definition of “objective.” These courts also fixed on the
words “employment practices” and “employment procedures” and
expanded them beyond the Griggs disparate impact context.
Thus, in disparate treatment cases, any standard company policy
or procedure on hiring and promotion was now subject to
challenge as insufficiently objective. Courts, particularly the
Eighth Circuit, seemed to want employers to justify the existence
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109
See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 468 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1972). In
Reid, a religious discrimination case, at issue was a company policy that required all
employees to be available to work on Saturdays. Reid, a black Seventh-Day
Adventist, refused to work on Saturday because of his religion. Although the case
deals with the impact of the recent incorporation of the concept of religious
accommodation and the employer’s affirmative defense into Title VII’s text through
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 701(j), 86
Stat. 103, the decision emphasizes Griggs as the force behind the Sixth Circuit’s
decision to remand the case on the issue of reasonable accommodation. Id. In other
words, given the specific language in Title VII, there was no need for the Sixth
Circuit to rely on Griggs. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the Sixth
Circuit believed that Griggs set a new global standard for employer decision making.
Thus, the majority opinion equates the Griggs Court’s definition of business
necessity with the statutory requirement of a reasonable religious accommodation,
such that the business necessity for a policy informed the issue of reasonable
accommodation. Id. Without establishing business necessity for the policy, there
could be no argument for failing to make a reasonable accommodation. Id. If the
policy did not pass the Griggs business necessity test, a failure to accommodate
amounted to religious discrimination. In fear that the district court missed the point,
a concurrence clarified:
To uphold such a policy and requirement the trial court must find that the
employer has sustained his burden of demonstrating that such policy and
practice is necessitated by the requirements of the employer’s business and
find further that such policy and practice is applied equally to all
employees.
Id. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring). As with the Eighth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
takes the Griggs Court’s business necessity holding completely out of the disparate
impact context.
110
See supra Part III.B.1.
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and application of their policies in ways that, contrary to Title
VII’s legislative history and design, threatened to undermine the
scope and force of the Doctrine.
Immediately on the heels of Griggs, the Eighth Circuit
decided the disparate treatment case Marquez v. Omaha District
Sale Office, Ford Division of Ford Motor Co.111 Marquez claimed
that Ford had failed to promote him for fifteen years because of
his national origin.112 Ford asserted its nationwide policy that
required Marquez, a grade-six manager, to have grade-seven
management-time to qualify for promotion to a grade-nine
management position. 113 Marquez had not been a grade-seven
manager.114 The trial court determined that, within the scope of
the time covered by his EEOC charge, there was no evidence of
discrimination.115 There being nothing objectionable about Ford’s
policy; Marquez’s only evidence of discrimination consisted of the
fact that he was the only minority employee and that, although
qualified, he had not been promoted to grade seven.116 There was
no evidence that Ford promoted someone less qualified over
Marquez.117
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111
Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971). The
Court decided Griggs on March 8, 1971. See 401 U.S. 424. The Eighth Circuit
decided Marquez on March 31, 1971. 440 F.2d 1157.
112
Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 313 F. Supp. 1404, 1405 (D. Neb.
1970).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1406 (“Under these circumstances, where plaintiff because of his
present lack of training is ineligible for a position and where there is absolutely no
evidence that this present requirement of experience . . . is foreseeably
discriminatory, it is the decision of the Court that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state
a cause for relief.”).
116
Id. at 1406.
117
A concern existed about the perpetuation of the historical impacts of
discrimination in company employment policies. Griggs, from one perspective,
represents the strongest move by the Court to ratify the belief that Title VII, as a
purely prospective measure, did too little to compensate for the obvious continuing
impacts of historical discrimination. In what would be known after Griggs as
disparate impact, at least one court before Griggs questioned the viability of facially
nondiscriminatory policies that continued to exclude blacks. In Gates v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., a black woman alleged disparate treatment in Georgia-Pacific’s failure
to hire her for a position in the advertising department. Georgia-Pacific filled three
of four slots with white internal hires, one of whom “had no academic preparation for
a career in accounting.” 326 F. Supp. 397, 398 (D. Or. 1970). In contrast, Mrs. Gates
was “academically the best prepared of any of the persons interviewed.” Id. When
Georgia-Pacific asserted a company policy of preferring internal candidates, the
court responded:
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Relying on its interpretation of Griggs, the Eighth Circuit
ruled in favor of Marquez.118 Out of context, the Eighth Circuit
cited Griggs for the proposition that Title VII allowed for
remedying the continuing effects of past discrimination.119 This
allowed the Eighth Circuit to revive Marquez’s claim in that he,
like the plaintiffs in Griggs, had been “frozen” in place.120 The
mere fact that the plaintiff, as the only minority employee in the
district, had not been promoted in fifteen years became prima
facie proof of discrimination.121 The Eighth Circuit deemed
Ford’s promotion policy, standing alone, an insufficient
legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason.122 Ford’s policy
only explained the job requirements.123 The Eighth Circuit
required Ford to explain why it had not allowed Marquez to meet
the job requirements by promoting him to grade seven,124 to
which Ford offered no explanation.
One year later, the Eighth Circuit decided Green v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.125 (“McDonnell Douglas I”) and created
a rough draft of the burden-shifting analysis.126 Although short-
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Such a policy, if it does not result in unlawful employment practices, does
not violate the statute. However, this defendant has few, if any, Negro
accountants or accounting clerks at the entry levels. A company policy of
recruiting [from within] would result in de facto exclusion of Negroes from
the better jobs whether the policy is intended to have that result or not.
Id. at 399.
118
Marquez, 440 F.2d at 1163.
119
Id. at 1160.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1159.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1162.
125
McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972).
126
Id. The Eighth Circuit’s decision in McDonnell Douglas I represented such a
dramatic statement against the at-will doctrine making it easy to misplace the link
to Marquez. Indeed, McDonnell Douglas I builds on the groundwork the Eighth
Circuit laid in Marquez. In Marquez, the Eighth Circuit refused to accept the mere
existence of a facially neutral policy that resulted in Marquez being “frozen” in place
and promotable. Marquez, 440 F.2d at 1160. Interstitially, this refusal represents
dissatisfaction with the alleged neutrality of employer decision making. It also
reflects the tension between the continued vitality of the Doctrine in the face of the
Griggs Court’s conclusion that Title VII contained a policy to remove unnecessary
roadblocks to equal employment opportunity. In McDonnell Douglas I, the majority
resolved this tension against the Doctrine by requiring employers to prove a
substantial relationship between adverse employment decisions and the actual job
requirements. McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d at 344. Judge Lay, concurring,
condemned the at-will doctrine in his homily on the evils of subjectivity:
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lived, standing alone, the Eighth Circuit’s McDonnell Douglas I
decision represented Title VII’s triumph over the at-will
employment doctrine.
Reminding readers that the Eighth
Circuit stood against subjectivity, the court stated, “employment
decisions based on subjective, rather than objective, criteria carry
little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination.”127 The court
specifically made objectivity the standard for employer decision
making.128 The Eighth Circuit based this conclusion squarely on
the Griggs holding. “If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.”129 The Eighth Circuit
also seemed to require an employer to prove an absence of
discrimination, similar to the “business necessity” affirmative
defense created in Griggs.130 Thus, after a plaintiff presents a
prima facie case of discrimination, “the burden passes to the
employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the
reasons offered for denying employment and the requirements of
the job.”131 The Eighth Circuit married these elements into an
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Blind acceptance of any non-discriminatory reason offered by an employer
in a fair employment case would always preclude correction of any
discriminatory practices otherwise existing. It has generally been said that
an employer may refuse to hire or decide to fire any employee for any
reason he chooses. Civil rights legislation and case law dealing with
discriminatory employment practices have added modification to these
principles. Discriminatory motives even though they constitute only a
partial basis for an employer’s refusal to hire are not sanctioned.
Id. at 345–46 (Lay, J., concurring). Marquez also shows the Eighth Circuit
demanding an employer to explain the nondiscriminatory basis for the result in
Marquez. In McDonnell Douglas I, the Eighth Circuit amplified this demand to a
specific requirement that “the employer to demonstrate a substantial relationship
between the reasons offered for denying employment and the requirements of the
job.” Id. at 344.
127
Id. at 343.
128
Id.
129
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
130
Id. at 344; see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
131
Id. In response to a request for rehearing and a very strong dissent, the
majority replaced this language with: “However, an applicant’s past participation in
unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer might indicate the applicant’s
lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that employer.” Id. at 353.
Nevertheless, the revised majority decision retained the language that really
threatened an employer’s ability to rely on non-job-related reasons for adverse
employment action: “Our prior decisions make clear that, in cases presenting
questions of discriminatory hiring practices, employment decisions based on
subjective, rather than objective, criteria carry little weight in rebutting charges of
discrimination.” Id. at 352.
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easy-to-prove prima facie case. Accordingly, once a claimant
proved that he was black, qualified for the job opening, and
denied a job which remained open or occupied by a white person,
an employer’s burden became proving the absence of
discrimination in the same employment decision.132 The Eighth
Circuit effectively rewrote Title VII. It adopted a definition of
discrimination analogous to the one Congress rejected and
burdened the employer with proving reasons asserted for any
adverse decision.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision plainly contradicts
congressional agreement that an employer never needs to prove
the absence of discrimination, but that the claimant bears that
burden.133 None of the interested parties, however, took this
position. Rather, the simplicity of the prima facie case, the
apparent burdening of the employer with an affirmative defense,
and the emphasis on objective job-related reasons for adverse
employment action drove McDonnell Douglas’s appeal to the
Supreme Court.134 In short, McDonnell Douglas believed that the
decision effectively nullified the employer’s right to make
subjective hiring decisions.135 Here, where “subjectivity” is the
code word for the Doctrine, the Eighth Circuit’s decision nullified
that as well.
3.

Any or No Reason—McDonnell Douglas II Returns Disparate
Treatment to Its Intended Course

132
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Id. at 344.
110 CONG. REC. 12,723–24 (1964).
134
See McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
135
McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d at 343.
136
McDonnell Douglas presented the question as follows: “In Civil Rights cases
involving allegedly discriminatory acts, should the defendant be precluded from
offering subjective evidence to explain his motivation for those acts?” Brief for
Petitioner at 2, McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (No. 72-490), 1973 WL
159430, at *2. Plaintiff Green presented the question as follows:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred, in including among the standards it
enunciated for the guidance of the District Court on remand the
admonition that “in cases presenting questions of discriminatory hiring
practices, employment decisions based on subjective, rather than objective,
criteria carry little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination.”
Brief for Respondent at 3, McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792 (No. 72-490), 1973
WL 172024, at *3. Oddly, McDonnell Douglas spent this argument trying to
133
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The Eighth Circuit’s nullification of at-will employment was
the issue confronting the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
v. Green.136 The Court responded by specifically reviving and
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strengthening at-will employment. The Court’s decision has
several facets, including confining Griggs to disparate impact
cases; formalizing the prima facie case of discrimination;
resurrecting
subjective
reasons
as
legitimate
and
nondiscriminatory; clarifying the employer’s duty to rebut but
not prove; and providing a link between the instant decision and
the legislative history of Title VII. All of these facets137 worked to
reaffirm the Doctrine’s dominance.138
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establish that the “objectivity” rule usurped the provenance of the fact finder in
cases where subjectivity of judgment was a key element of understanding the
challenged decision. Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 34–39. It was in McDonnell
Douglas’s argument challenging the prima facie case holding that McDonnell
Douglas focused the Court on the danger of Title VII becoming a for-cause
termination statute. Id. at 28–30. McDonnell Douglas argued that section 706(g)
specifically ratifies at-will decision making in that section 706(g) preserved employer
rights to make nondiscriminatory business decisions on any basis with or without
job-relatedness. Moreover, McDonnell Douglas argued that section 706(g) had once
required for-cause termination but had been amended, and in striking the for-cause
portion, “any employer action would expressly be beyond the pale of the Act if taken
‘for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion or
national origin.’ ” Id. at 28–29.
137
As discussed supra in Part III.B.1, the prima facie case was never a real
problem, as the concept was well understood in the lower courts. One is therefore led
to wonder about the relevance of that part of the Court’s decision. The race-baiting
tenor of the petitioner’s brief may have had an impact. Id. at 17, 20–22. More likely,
the discussion of the employer’s rebuttal case, legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons,
and the fact that the employer has no burden of proof required the prima facie case
as a counterpoint. Despite the race-baiting of McDonnell Douglas’s briefing,
McDonnell Douglas raised a significant issue; the Eighth Circuit did not explain the
need for its prima facie case formula. Id. at 17. In other words, what was the
relevance, standing alone, of Green’s blackness? Although the Court largely adopted
the Eighth Circuit’s formula, the Court did not use its McDonnell Douglas II opinion
to answer the question either. It was not until four years after McDonnell Douglas
II, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, that the Court used a
footnote to begin explaining its reasoning for the prima facie case. 431 U.S. 324
(1977). According to that decision, the point of the prima facie case was to exclude
the following:
[T]he two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might
rely to reject a job applicant [are] an absolute or relative lack of
qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought. Elimination of
these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient, absent other explanation,
to create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory one.
Id. at 358 n.44. In 1978, the Court again discussed the function of the prima facie
case without answering the original question: What is the relevance of race standing
alone? In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, the Court explained the prima facie
case as “merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination. . . . And we are
willing to presume [discrimination] largely because we know from our experience
that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner.” 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978). The Furnco Court went on to say, “[W]e infer discriminatory animus
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The Court commandeered the Eighth Circuit’s prima facie
case formula. In doing so, the Court addressed the issues of the
employer’s burden of proof and the quality of the evidence an
employer could rely on to avoid liability. As described above, the
Eighth Circuit created a prima facie case that allowed a claimant
to establish actionable discrimination with no actual evidence of
That version of the prima facie case
discrimination.139
represented a powerful proxy for proof of discrimination once
coupled with a requirement that the employer, arguably, prove
an objective job-related reason for an adverse decision. The
Court appropriated the prima facie case but decoupled it from the
other elements that made it so potent and potentially dangerous
to the at-will employment doctrine. The Court’s version of the
prima facie case remained a proxy for discrimination,140 but a
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because experience has proved that in the absence of any other explanation it is
more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on impermissible
considerations.” Id. at 580. The only rational conclusion to draw from the Court’s use
of “experience” and “common experience,” is a common experience with
discrimination. See id. at 577. To determine the significance of race standing alone,
the Court’s theory is that because employers overtly discriminated against blacks
prior to Title VII, they continue to do so covertly after Title VII. Accordingly, one
infers that race standing alone is the reason for an adverse employment action when
a claimant establishes the other elements of the prima facie case. The importance of
the prima facie case from this perspective is not that, as the Court has pointed out, it
is easy to prove. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 270 (1989) (“The prima
facie case established there was not difficult to prove.”); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The burden of establishing a prima facie case
of disparate treatment is not onerous.”). The importance of the prima facie case was
its potential for capturing covert discriminatory behavior, which might actually have
made Title VII intolerant of any discrimination “subtle or otherwise.” McDonnell
Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 801.
138
As to the Eighth Circuit’s view that Griggs required all employment policies
or practices to meet the objective job-relatedness standard, there is little to tell. The
Court chose not to debate the point. By silently ignoring the issue, the Court made it
go away. To assure distance between Griggs and the claimant in that case, the Court
distinguished Griggs on its facts, including that all of the Griggs claimants were
innocent victims and that Mr. Green was not. The Court in McDonnell Douglas II
specifically distinguished Griggs because Griggs dealt with the disparate impact of
standardized testing and the impermissibility of freezing blacks out of employment
opportunities because of the continuing impacts of segregation. McDonnell Douglas
II, 411 U.S. at 805–06. Moreover, the victims in Griggs had done nothing to deserve
being excluded from employment opportunities. Id. Green presented a different
picture because he engaged in illegal protest activity. Id. at 806. The distinction
between disparate impact and disparate treatment after McDonnell Douglas II has
been so clear that there are no Supreme Court cases reflecting an effort to tread that
path again.
139
McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d at 344.
140
McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 802.
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very fragile one. Rather than a burden of proof, an employer
would only have to rebut the prima facie case in order to destroy
it,141 leaving the burden of proof with the claimant at all times142
and as a final step, firmly saddling the claimant with the
requirement to prove intentional discrimination based on a
prescribed characteristic.143 On the issue of the quality of the
employer’s rebuttal evidence, the Court implicitly commanded
lower courts to defer to employers.144 Explicitly, the Court
stamped what the Eighth Circuit and the parties called
“subjective” evidence as perfectly legitimate when it stated,
“[T]he [Eighth Circuit] seriously underestimated the rebuttal
weight to which [McDonnell Douglas’s] reasons were entitled.”145
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court tied its
decision to Title VII’s legislative history, which affirmed the
Doctrine’s dominant role.146 Legislative history validated the
Court’s position on the rebuttal weight employer reasons should
receive.
Without literally citing to the “management
prerogatives” language, the Supreme Court created the
paraphrase: “There are societal as well as personal interests on
both sides of this equation. The broad, overriding interest,
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and
trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially
neutral employment and personnel decisions.”147

141
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Id. at 802–06.
Id. at 805 (“In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid
reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory
decision.”); id. at 805 n.18 (“[Green] must be given a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the stated reasons for his
rejection, the decision was in reality racially premised.”).
143
Id. at 805.
144
Id. at 803–06. Examples of the Court’s implied guidance to defer to the
employer’s reasons for adverse employment decisions include its discussion of an
employer’s right to discharge employees for unlawful activity directed against an
employer by striking employees under the NLRA and highlighting past conduct and
past loyalty as part of the broader list of legitimate reasons for personnel decisions.
145
Id. at 803.
146
Id. at 803–04.
147
Id. at 801. The criticism of McDonnell Douglas II as having no link to
legislative history overlooks this key language. Yes, the Court added a third party—
the consumer—to the employer-employee relationship, which is confusing given the
absence of any reference in the legislative history or the statute to a consumerprotection purpose. The logical explanation for the failure of McDonnell Douglas’s
critics to make the link is supplied by Professor Corbett’s proposition that this
142
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The at-will employment doctrine appears in McDonnell
Douglas II under the guise of a “broad, overriding interest,
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, [in] efficient and
trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially
neutral employment and personnel decisions.”148 The statement
reflects the restraint Title VII’s pivotal supporters required when
they insisted that “management prerogatives, and union
freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent
possible”149 and that the “[i]nternal affairs of employers and labor
organizations must not be interfered with except to the limited
extent that correction is required in discrimination practices.”150
In subsequent cases, the Court explicitly linked its McDonnell
Douglas II jurisprudence to legislative history, clarifying the
dominant role of the Doctrine on the Court and the Court’s belief
that the Doctrine dominated congressional decision making as
well.151
There was never an “escalating subordination of . . . [Title
VII] to employment at will.”152 In disparate treatment cases,
arguably since 1965, certainly since 1973, Title VII has always
been subordinate to employment-at-will.
Describing the
relationship otherwise inaccurately suggests a status Title VII
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particular alias for employment-at-will made it hard to recognize. Corbett, The
“Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 308.
148
McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 801. Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine quotes this passage from McDonnell Douglas II and explains it by
invoking “management prerogatives.” 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
149
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 29 (1963).
150
Id.
151
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (“Title VII eliminates
certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving
employers’ freedom of choice. This balance between employee rights and employer
prerogatives turns out to be decisive in the case before us.” (emphasis added)); id. at
242 (“The statute’s maintenance of employer prerogatives is evident from the statute
itself and from its history, both in Congress and in this Court.”); Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 259 (“[Title VII] was not intended to ‘diminish traditional management
prerogatives.’ ” (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979)));
Weber, 443 U.S. at 206 (“Title VII could not have been enacted into law without
substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted
federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for
their support that ‘management prerogatives, and union freedoms . . . be left
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.’ ” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2,
at 29 (1963)) (alteration in original)).
152
Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 305, 311.
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never actually possessed.153 The fact the Court regularly had to
explain the meaning of McDonnell Douglas II in subsequent
cases is not evidence of a resurgent at-will employment doctrine
that had been suppressed. Rather, it is evidence that individual
decision makers in lower courts have not, or could not, assimilate
Title VII’s limitations, or that litigants, usually claimants,
refused to believe lower courts had gotten it right.154
To a great degree, the Court must accept responsibility for
any confusion about Title VII’s operative parameters in disparate
treatment cases. Griggs created the environment that required
McDonnell Douglas II.155 McDonnell Douglas II contains the
sweeping statement that Title VII tolerates no discrimination
subtle or otherwise, yet gives employers back their right to
engage in subjective decision making156—a well acknowledged
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153
The earliest Title VII scholars recognized its weakness. Richard Berg, for
example, wrote:
The enforcement procedures of the title, however, bear only too visibly the
marks of compromise, and seem to me to contain serious deficiencies. It
seems questionable that much can be accomplished through suits in federal
court by persons aggrieved by acts of discrimination. The practical
advantages will lie heavily with the defendants, and even where the
evidence of discrimination is overwhelming, it cannot be expected that
many complainants will undertake the burden of an individual suit.
Berg, supra note 75, at 96–97; see also Charles T. Schmidt, Jr., Title VII: Coverage
and Comments, 7 B.C. L. REV. 459, 462–63 (1966) (“And compliance with the letter
[of Title VII]—both in terms of coverage and substance—may very well impose
inconveniences and require more imagination to enable the continuation of practices
which exclude Negroes from employment, but the legislation, as presently conceived,
can do little to effectively prohibit these practices.”).
154
The failure of lower courts to heed McDonnell Douglas II arose from an
unextinguished desire that the asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason be in
some way objectively satisfactory. See Burdine v. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 608
F.2d 563, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1979); Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085,
1089 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir.
1973)).
155
Although the Court at some point was likely to face the question of when
circumstantial evidence amounted to proof of intentional disparate treatment, as
argued in this Article, there is an obvious causal relationship that required the
Court to address the question in 1973; Griggs led the Eighth Circuit, contrary to
legislative intent, to limit employer discretion in disparate treatment cases to
objective criteria, which required the Court to restore employer discretion to the full
scope envisioned by the Eighty-eighth Congress.
156
McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 803 (1973).
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breeding ground for covert discrimination.157 Nevertheless, the
Court, single-mindedly, has kept Title VII confined and at-will
dominant.
After McDonnell Douglas II, the Court in every other
significant disparate treatment case reaffirmed at-will’s
dominant status in three ways. The Court conformed Title VII’s
actual impact to Congress’s intention to eliminate only the worst
forms of discrimination by formalizing the direct versus
circumstantial evidence dichotomy. In so doing, the Court left
claims of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence easy
prey to the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.158 The Court
also regularly confirmed that in order to rebut the prima facie
case and dispel any inference of discrimination, the legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason must be asserted, not proved.159
Finally, the Court confirmed the scope of management
prerogatives as inclusive reasons that may not have been
asserted, so long as the claimant failed to ultimately show that
adverse employment action occurred because of a proscribed
reason.160
C.

The Triumph of At-Will

1.

The Direct Versus Circumstantial Evidence Dichotomy

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

157
McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston
Cnty. Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Courts have often
observed that proof of overt racial discrimination in employment is seldom direct.”
(citing United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 422 (5th Cir.
1971))); Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971);
Holland v. Edwards, 119 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1954).
158
See McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 802–03; see also supra Part III.B.
159
McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 802–03.
160
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259; United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206
(1979).
161
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963). Professor Michael Selmi has argued
that the Court appears only to be able to see the most overt discrimination, but he
does not offer a complete explanation for why the Court gives that appearance. It is
true that the Court can only perceive the grossest forms of race discrimination. The
reason why, at least under Title VII, is that it is all Congress intended the Court to
perceive as actionable race discrimination. Selmi, supra note 6, at 324–28, 335.
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Discrimination proved by direct evidence is, by definition,
one of the “most serious types of discrimination.”161 McDonnell
Douglas II made direct evidence cases impossible for employers
to win because an employer could not avoid an award of
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meaningful
compensation
by
asserting
a
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason.
Title VII’s affirmative purpose
directed this outcome.162 Discrimination proved by any other
means had to be balanced against Congressional intent to leave
at-will in place.163 That is exactly what the Court achieved in
McDonnell Douglas II. The Court isolated discrimination based
on circumstantial evidence and formalized the prima facie case
as a proxy for intentional discrimination subject to the
articulation of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.164 The
prima facie case is an eggshell.
The legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason is a fifty-pound sledgehammer.
Disparate treatment cases like McDonnell Douglas II are
supposed to be hard to win.
2.

The Fragility of the Prima Facie Case—The Return of “Any
Reason or No Reason”

162
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See supra Part III.A.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 206 (“Title VII could not have been enacted into law
without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally
resisted federal regulation of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price
for their support that ‘management prerogatives, and union freedoms . . . be left
undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.’ ”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at
29 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391).
164
McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. at 802–03.
165
William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS.
L. REV. 1549, 1555 (2005); Corbett, Of Babies, supra note 14, at 377; Corbett, The
“Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 332 n.134; McGinley, supra note 1, at 229.
166
McDonnell Douglas I, 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1972).
167
See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the direct versus circumstantial evidence
dichotomy).
163
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It is axiomatic that the Court intended the prima facie case
as a proplaintiff device.165 It was easy to prove because it
provided a proxy for intentional discrimination in a world where
direct evidence of discrimination was becoming increasingly hard
to come by.166 Yet, as soon as an employer articulated a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, regardless of plausibility,
the proxy for intentional discrimination disappeared. If the
McDonnell Douglas II Court’s purpose really was proplaintiff,
why create such a fragile proxy for intentional discrimination?
The fragility of the prima facie case cannot be explained by a
single factor. Part of the explanation lies in the Court’s need to
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence cases,
which would thereby achieve Title VII’s actual purposes.167
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Another part of the explanation lies in the statutory requirement
that a plaintiff prove intentional discrimination in order to
receive meaningful relief.168 Thus, a prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas II only creates a “legally mandatory,
rebuttable presumption [of discriminatory intent].”169 It does not
“describe the plaintiff’s burden of producing enough evidence to
permit the trier of fact to infer [discriminatory intent].”170
A proxy for intentional discrimination by definition cannot
replace proof of intentional discrimination. So, the prima facie
case would have to be fragile by necessity in order to compel a
plaintiff to actually prove the ultimate issue of an employment
action due to discrimination because of race. Another part of the
explanation for the fragility of the prima facie case is its role in
describing the limits of the at-will employment doctrine postTitle VII. Although this Article argues that, for practical
purposes, in the absence of what would amount to direct evidence
of discrimination, “any or no reason” continues to define the
actual limits of employer discretion; the prima facie case invites
employers to publicly ascribe some nondiscriminatory reason to
an adverse employment action. In order to encourage employers
to accept this invitation without risk to existing management
prerogatives, the presumption of discrimination falls apart once a
reason is given.
a.

“Any Reason”: The Articulation of a Legitimate
Nondiscriminatory Reason and the Presumption of Legitimacy

168
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012).
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).
170
Id.
171
See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 249–50; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 575–76 (1978); Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24,
24–25 (1978) (per curiam).
172
See McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
169
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Although the Court in McDonnell Douglas II negated the
Eighth Circuit’s effort to make the legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason as much like an affirmative defense as possible, the Court
used ambiguous language to do so. The Court’s lack of clarity
spawned litigation to clarify the exact nature of the employer’s
burden in disparate treatment cases.171 The Court in McDonnell
Douglas II used the term “burden shifting,”172 but did not specify
that the burden that shifted was one of production rather than
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177

Id.
Id.
438 U.S. 567.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id. at 577.
Id.
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persuasion or proof. Moreover, the use of the euphonious word
“articulate” to describe the employer’s obligation to describe his
reasoning had a significance of its own,173 but the Court also
failed to focus on the significance of that word choice. This lack
of specificity and definition led to a failure to comprehend the
true power of the mere articulation of a nondiscriminatory basis
over a disputed employment action which, perhaps, ought to have
been obvious because of the Court’s pronounced rejection of the
need for an objective rationale for an adverse employment
decision. The Court’s coded message intended for lower courts to
apply the “any reason” principle of at-will employment,
prohibiting only those reasons proscribed by Title VII.174 A key
piece of that message was that “any reason” really meant any
reason, and the employer had no burden of proof or persuasion.
In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,175 the Court
reinforced the McDonnell Douglas II message but again used
inexact language to do so. In Waters, the Seventh Circuit
rejected the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
because it was “haphazard, arbitrary, and subjective.”176 The
Supreme Court responded with the at-will employment message
of McDonnell Douglas II: “Courts are generally less competent
than employers to restructure business practices, and unless
mandated to do so by Congress[,] they should not attempt it.”177
In correcting the Seventh Circuit’s misunderstanding of the
employer’s burden, the Court muddied the waters. “[I]t is
apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is merely
that of proving that he based his employment decision on a
legitimate consideration . . . . To prove that, he need not prove
that he pursued the course which would both enable him to
achieve his own business goal . . . .”178 The Seventh Circuit
considered the goal to be the best hiring practices.179 Here, as
with “articulate” in McDonnell Douglas II, the Court suggests the
employer’s burden is not one of proof, but one of merely proving,
despite the Court’s repeated use of prove and proving.
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In the very next term, the Court decided, per curiam, Board
of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney.180 This time, it was
the First Circuit that confused the employer’s burden. According
to the First Circuit, on one hand, “in requiring the defendant to
prove absence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme Court [in
McDonnell Douglas II] placed the burden squarely on the party
with the greater access to such evidence.”181 On the other hand,
the First Circuit accurately quoted the McDonnell Douglas II
decision’s description of burden shifting: “The burden then shifts
to the defendant to rebut the prima facie case by showing that a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason accounted for its actions.”182
Again, the Court affirmed the McDonnell Douglas II at-will
message and failed to offer complete clarification:
While words such as “articulate,” “show,” and “prove,” may have
more or less similar meanings depending upon the context in
which they are used, we think that there is a significant
distinction between merely “articulat[ing] some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” and “prov[ing] absence of
discriminatory motive.” By reaffirming and emphasizing the
McDonnell Douglas analysis in Furnco Construction Co. v.
Waters . . . we made it clear that the former will suffice to meet
the employee’s prima facie case of discrimination.183

180
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439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam).
Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182
Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
183
Id. at 25.
184
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
185
Id. at 252. The Court’s problem with the Fifth Circuit’s decision is only
somewhat more involved:
The [Fifth Circuit] reaffirmed its previously announced views that the
defendant in a Title VII case bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance
of
the
evidence
the
existence
of
legitimate
181
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Sweeney focuses on the action of “merely articulating” in
contrast to “proving.” It confirms that “merely articulating”
meets the employer’s burden. But, in contrasting that action
with “proving,” Sweeney made the important clarification that
“merely articulating” was not “proving.”
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,184 the
Court finally fully described the employer’s burden to articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. For our purposes, Burdine
is a reprise of Sweeney: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
burdened the employer with proving the legitimate
This time, when the Court
nondiscriminatory reason.185
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described the burden shifting, it carefully limited the use of the
words “proving” and “prove” to the plaintiff’s prima facie case and
to pretext.186 With equal precision, the Court described the
employer’s task. “[I]f the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s
rejection.’ ”187 Significantly, the Court clarified the power of
merely articulating some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason by
stating, “The defendant need not persuade the court that it was
actually motivated by the proffered reasons.”188
In later cases, the Court reiterated that the legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason need not be proved and need not be the
actual reason.189 This proposition merely restates the at-will
employment doctrine. The Doctrine does not require an employer
to justify its employment decisions at all. In observance of that
principle, an employer has no burden of proof in disparate
treatment cases.
This conclusion is consistent with the
legislative history and the text of Title VII.190 Moreover, if an
employer gives any reason for an employment action, that reason
is presumptively legitimate, even if it is not the actual reason.191
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action and that the
defendant also must prove by objective evidence that those hired or
promoted were better qualified than the plaintiff.
Id.
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186
Id. at 252–53. “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff.” Id. at 253.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 254.
189
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks (Hicks II), 509 U.S. 502, 528–29 (1993); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 278–79 (1989).
190
See supra Part II.
191
Here, we see the other incursion Title VII made into the dominion of at-will
employment. Prior to Title VII, an employer’s unbridled discretion did not even
admit the question, “Why?” After Title VII, an employer had an incentive to provide
some answer. A detailed review of the prima facie case, discussed infra, fully maps
the miniscule proportion of territory the at-will doctrine gave up to Title VII on this
issue. Hopkins, however, provides additional refinement by defining the level of
deference courts were to give to an employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 290. Justice White hinted at the legitimacy presumption when
he took the position that, even in the face of proven illegitimate considerations, an
employer’s subjective view of the outcome in the absence of such considerations
“should be ample proof.” Id. at 261. Justice O’Connor’s response to Justice White
amplified the legitimacy of the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
According to Justice O’Connor, after a mixed-motives plaintiff shows that an
illegitimate motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action, “[t]he
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This conclusion reaffirms the McDonnell Douglas II message:
Courts are not to dispute the relative subjectivity or objectivity of
the articulated nondiscriminatory business reason.192 Although
there may be incentives for an employer to articulate the actual
reason for any employment action,193 maximizing “existing
management prerogatives” militates against any requirement
that the reason be the actual reason.194 In the McDonnell
Douglas II case, literally any reason is “entitled to the same
presumption of good faith.”195
b.

“Or No Reason”: Hidden Legitimate Nondiscriminatory
Reasons

A complete discussion of the at-will employment doctrine’s
domination of Title VII must deal with the second part of the
traditional statement of the doctrine: “any reason, or no reason.”
At first blush, McDonnell Douglas appears to prohibit an
employer from escaping liability by remaining silent. The
apparent requirement that an employer articulate some reason
for its decision seems meaningless if an employer asserts no
reason. That would be the case if burden shifting actually
required an employer to state the actual reason for an adverse
decision. As described earlier in this Article, this is emphatically
not required by McDonnell Douglas. Moreover, consistent with
the number of alter egos of at-will and coded messages from the
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employer has not yet been shown to be a violator, but neither is it entitled to the
same presumption of good faith concerning its employment decisions which is
accorded employers facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” Id. at
265–66. The “presumption of good faith” described the true power of the presumptive
legitimacy of the articulated reason regardless of subjectivity. See id.
192
McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973).
193
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
194
In Hopkins, for example, Justice O’Connor took the position that an employer
would never have to state or prove the actual reason, unless the employee proved its
case by direct evidence. This position is in line with at-will primacy by creating a
special subset of the very small number of direct evidence discrimination cases
already isolated by McDonnell Douglas II. Within that subset, an employer can give
up the complete freedom of at-will and accept the burden of proving an affirmative
defense. The benefit to the employer of giving some ground on at-will in this specific
circumstance is that, in the conflict between direct evidence of discrimination and
proof of a true, legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment
decision, the employee wins an injunction and the employer wins the financial
victory. The point here is that mere articulation of a reason, which may or may not
be true, is such a small diminution of the at-will prerogative that is literally
meaningless. See supra Parts I, II.
195
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 265–66.
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509 U.S. 502, 536–37 (1993).
Id. at 509–10.
198
Corbett, The “Fall” of Summers, supra note 14, at 341.
199
See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the McDonnell Douglas II restoration of atwill employment by reversing the Eighth Circuit).
200
See supra Part III.C.2.a (explaining Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567 (1978); Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per
curiam); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228).
201
Hicks II, 509 U.S. at 504–05.
197
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Court, “or no reason” remained camouflaged within the pretext
stage of McDonnell Douglas. When the Court revealed the
existence of the “no reason” half of the phrase in St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks196 (“Hicks II”), the Court reaffirmed that a
court
need
not
believe
the
articulated
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons and the employer need not have
asserted the actual legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
decision.197
It has been said that “Hicks reached a new level in the
subordination of employment discrimination law.”198 To the
contrary, Hicks II was foreshadowed in the Court’s Title VII
jurisprudence.199 All of those decisions forthrightly state that the
plaintiff has the burden to prove discrimination because of a
proscribed characteristic.200 Anything less than that standard
required a finding in favor of the employer because of the
inherent limitations imposed on Title VII by the need to preserve
the maximum extent of management prerogatives and the
statute’s language limiting the recovery of meaningful relief to
only those circumstances where any reason other than race was
absent. Hicks II, accordingly, served to limit Title VII to its place
as a narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine. From
that perspective, Hicks II is hardly objectionable given the
Court’s repeated although disguised admonition that the
Doctrine dominates disparate treatment claims under Title VII.
If Hicks II reached a new level, it was a new level of clarity.
Hicks, a black prison guard at St. Mary’s Honor Center of
the Missouri Department of Corrections, claimed his demotion
and termination constituted disparate treatment under Title
VII.201 The trial judge found that Hicks had proved his prima
facie case; St. Mary’s had asserted two legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons, and Hicks had shown those reasons
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to be pretextual.202 The district court then proceeded to analyze
the evidence under the McDonnell Douglas II decision’s third
stage for proof, “that race was the determining factor in
defendant’s decision.”203 Although the district court found ample
evidence that the defendant “placed [Hicks] on the express track
to termination,”204 Hicks did not prove that the termination “was
racially rather than personally motivated.”205
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court.206 The Eighth
Circuit took issue with the district court for assuming an
unasserted reason for St. Mary’s action: that the motivation was
personal rather than racial.207 Moreover, the court took the
position that once Hicks, or any other defendants in this type of
suit, proved that the articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons were pretext, “defendants were in a position of having
offered no legitimate reason for their actions.”208 Once a plaintiff
proved, through pretext, that the defendant offered no legitimate
nondiscriminatory
reason,
a
plaintiff
also
proved
discrimination.209 In the context of the at-will employment
doctrine, the Eighth Circuit’s implementation of McDonnell
Douglas II represented a significant territorial acquisition for
Title VII. According to the Eighth Circuit, Title VII through
McDonnell Douglas II modified the at-will employment doctrine
such that “any reason” actually required the employer to state an
ultimately persuasive reason, and “no reason” or silence,
established either by literal silence or proof of pretext, did not
survive.210
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202
Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(“Pretext is a statement that does not describe the actual reasons for the decision.”
(citing Mister v. Ill. C.G.R. Co., 832 F.2d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987))).
203
Id. at 1251.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 1252.
206
Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. (Hicks I), 970 F.2d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1992).
207
Id. at 492. Showing that its thirst for objectivity was not dead, the Eighth
Circuit even went so far as to question “whether such a hypothetical reason based
upon personal motivation even could be stated and still be ‘legitimate’ and
‘nondiscriminatory.’ ” Id. (emphasis omitted).
208
Id.
209
Id. at 493.
210
Id. at 492. There is something Quixote-esque about the Eighth Circuit’s
position. Hicks I appears to be a reprise of the Eighth Circuit’s McDonnell Douglas I
effort to reimagine Title VII. For example, the conclusion that the legitimacy of the
nondiscriminatory reason is contingent on its persuasiveness echoes the earlier
quest for objective standards to justify an adverse employment action. The Eighth
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Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia corrected the Eighth
Circuit’s misinterpretation of McDonnell Douglas II. The circuit
court erred in equating an incredible reason with no reason and
silence. According to Justice Scalia, rather than being in the
same position they would have been had they remained silent,
“[b]y producing evidence (whether ultimately persuasive or not)
of nondiscriminatory reasons, [St. Mary’s] sustained their burden
of production, and thus placed themselves in a ‘better position
than if they had remained silent.’ ”211 This is true, as Justice
Scalia explained, because the articulation of any reason dispelled
the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie
case.212
A pretextual reason that amounts to no reason because it is
unpersuasive is not the same as silence. This kind of “no reason”
equally dispels the prima facie case presumption because it is
more accurately viewed as “no good reason” or a “bad reason.”
Both of these conceptions of an incredible reason fall well within
the acknowledged safe harbor of the presumptive legitimacy of
“any reason.” Accordingly, while a pretextual reason may allow a
finding of discrimination, a pretextual reason does not compel a
finding of discrimination because it does not necessarily show
pretext for discrimination.213
On its face, Hicks II seems only to clarify that proving
pretext is not enough in every case to also prove discrimination.
Only somewhat less transparently, Hicks II confirms that there
was nothing problematic about the trial court finding that St.
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Circuit made this effort despite the Court’s specific statement in Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine that “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court
that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
Moreover, showing a continuing thirst for invigorating Title VII with objective
standards, the Eighth Circuit even went so far as to question “whether such a
hypothetical reason based upon personal motivation even could be stated and still be
‘legitimate’ and ‘nondiscriminatory.’ ” Hicks I, 970 F.2d at 492 (emphasis omitted).
This occurred in spite of the early recognition given to personality conflicts as a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, and the Furnco Court’s sanctioning of
“haphazard, arbitrary, and subjective” business reasons as legitimate under
McDonnell Douglas II. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra Part I.
211
Hicks II, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
212
Id. at 509–10.
213
Id. at 511. In overcoming some awkward language from Burdine, Justice
Scalia clearly described the pretext issue as one of being pretext for discrimination,
which can only be shown if the reason for the adverse decision was false and if the
true reason was discrimination. Id. at 515–16.
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214

Id. at 523.
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 523–24. Although Justice Scalia did not cite to the statute for this
statement, it is the substance of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2012).
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Mary’s hid, through pretextual reasons, the actual reason for
Hicks’s termination: personality conflict. If one accepts that the
action of articulating incredible reasons and remaining silent as
to the actual reasons amounts to no reason, then St. Mary’s
escaped liability by giving no reason for Hicks’s termination.
This concept gave Justice Scalia not the least bit of trouble.
Responding to the argument that allowing a reason to remain
hidden, “lurking in the record,”214 until discovered by a trial court
unfairly hamstrung a plaintiff, Justice Scalia wrote, “It makes no
sense.”215 The fallacy of that argument resides in the notion that
a plaintiff must only refute articulated reasons under McDonnell
Douglas II.216 To the contrary, “Title VII does not award
damages
against
employers
who
cannot
prove
a
nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but
only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse
employment action by reason of . . . race.”217 In other words, the
requirement of proof of actual discrimination leaves “no reason” a
vibrant attribute of the dominant at-will paradigm.
The question remains whether it is possible for an employer
to literally assert “no reason” by remaining silent in a disparate
treatment case. The answer is maybe. Although the prima facie
case is just a proxy for intentional discrimination, wisdom
dictates the proxy’s destruction by the articulation of a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. On the other hand, the failure to
rebut the prima facie case still leaves the plaintiff with only a
proxy for, but not proof of, intentional discrimination. Under
Hicks II, a plaintiff with only a proxy for intentional
discrimination is in no better position than a plaintiff with only
proof of pretext: Neither is entitled to a finding of intentional
discrimination as a matter of law.
Employers’
continued
articulation
of
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons symbolizes Title VII’s conquest of that
much of the Doctrine’s territory domain; employers now believe
that they must offer an explanation for an adverse employment
decision. The value of this belief as a symbol of Title VII’s
triumph, however, must be judged against the legitimate

215
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nondiscriminatory reasons’ power to trigger the summary
dismissal of a disparate treatment claim. In that regard, the
Doctrine has taken on a new alias, and employers remain as
empowered as ever.
CONCLUSION
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It is easy to be disillusioned with the Court’s apparent
mismanagement of one of the civil rights era’s landmarks.
Among others, the Court is at fault for the disillusionment. The
Court, for example, told us, “Title VII tolerates no discrimination,
subtle or otherwise.”218 We chose to believe that statement. We
also chose to believe that fifty years ago, something truly ground
breaking occurred when the moral principle of equality became
imbedded in federal law. Fifty years on, we need to make other
choices. Mainly, we need to resist the urge to superimpose
purposes on Title VII that the Eighty-eighth Congress never
intended and therefore never built into Title VII. Congress’s
purpose for Title VII was the ending of the worst forms of
discrimination and the preservation of the Doctrine. Since Title
VII’s purpose was not the eradication of all forms of employment
discrimination, the Court, therefore cannot be at fault for
reflecting Title VII’s limited purpose in McDonnell Douglas II.
There are no fixes for Title VII. It does the work it was designed
to do under the Court’s accurate stewardship. The Doctrine
remains dominant. Since the Doctrine has always dominated
Title VII, if there is a fix to be found, focusing on the Doctrine
and its role in antidiscrimination law seems like a good place to
start fixing antidiscrimination law.

McDonnell Douglas II, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
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